Marquette Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 4 Spring 1958

Article 6

Testing the Validity of a Wisconsin Income Tax
Rule Through a Declaratory Judgment Action
George J. Maly Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
George J. Maly Jr., Testing the Validity of a Wisconsin Income Tax Rule Through a Declaratory Judgment Action, 41 Marq. L. Rev. 446
(1958).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol41/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

TESTING THE VALIDITY OF A WISCONSIN
INCOME TAX RULE THROUGH A
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION
The 1955 session of the Wisconsin Legislature revised and expanded the procedure for the making, promulgating, and validating of
rules by administrative agencies. In providing for determination of the
validity of a rule the legislature expanded and clarified the provisions
for declaratory judgment actions.
Under the Revised Statutes the means of judicial determination of
the validity of a rule of any administrative agency is an action for
declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Dane County.' This
court is to render a judgment determining the validity or invalidity of
a rule when it appears ". . . that the rule or its threatened application
interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the
legal rights and privileges of the plaintiff." 2 This procedure is limited
to a certain extent, however, in that a rule can be declared invalid in
such an action only if the rule violates a constitutional provision, exceeds the sattutory authority of the agency making it, or was adopted
3
without adherence to statutory rule making procedure.
When the declaratory judgment provisions are applied to rules
issued by the Wisconsin Department of Taxation several perplexing
questions of statutory interpretation arise. This is particularly true
when the new statutes are considered in conjunction with pre-existing
statutes providing for assessments of income taxes by the Department
of Taxation and judicial review of such assessments.
In the first place, it would seem that the taxpayer may, in some
instances, challenge the validity of a rule in a declaratory judgment
action prior to the time an assessment is made by the Department of
Taxation based on such rule. The Legislative Committee on Administrative Rule Making, in considering the value of the declaratory judgment action, stated:
".... it enables disputes to be determined in their incipiency ....
a decision as to the validity of a rule can be obtained without
first taking a chance on having violated the rule. . .. "4
The question is: in what type of situation does the taxpayer have
standing to challenge the validity of a rule? Must he wait until he files
'WIs.

STATS.

§227.05(1) (1955).

2Ibid.
3 Wis. STATS.

§227.05(5) (1955) ; 227.014(2) (a) grants administrative agencies

power to make rules to "effectuate the purpose of the statutes." Such rules
are not valid if they "exceed the bounds of correct interpretation" of the
statutes, however. Thus it would seem that an interpretative rule might be
declared invalid in a declaratory judgment action if it "exceeds the bounds of
correct interpretation." For the distinction between interpretative and legislative rules see Comment, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 414, at 416 (1957).
4 11

Wis. Legis. Council Report, Part II, at 117 (1955).
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an income tax return which includes a transaction to which the rule
would apply? May he challenge it on the basis of a transaction entered
into which will be taxed under the rule in the future? Is the fact that
he is contemplating entering into a transaction which will be taxed
under the rule adequate to give him such standing? Clearly much of
the usefulness of declaratory judgment actions is dependent upon the
answer to these questions. 5
The Legislative Committee declined to specify the factual situation
which would give a taxpayer standing to challenge the validity of a
rule. They stated:
"Judicial review sometimes may be denied on the ground that
the person requesting the review has no standing to challenge the
rule or the action in question. Such decisions usually speak in
terms of the absence of 'legal right' and occasionally in terms of
absence of 'case or controversy.' The concept of 'legal right' defies exact definition ....

The basic question is whether or not

the petitioner asserts an interest which under the circumstances
is deserving of legal protection. The way the question is answered varies from case to care."'6
"227.05 provides that the court shall render a declaratory
judgment as to the validity of a rule when the rule interferes or
threatens to interfere with or impair the 'legal rights and privileges of the petitioner' . . . While the court is apt to speak in

terms of such statutory language when deciding questions of
standing to challenge, the basic problem of who has standing to
challenge 'an
administrative rule is not altered by such general
7
language."

"The law pertaining to who has the right to challenge the
validity of an administrative rule is largely court law. Probably
little could be done in an administrative procedure act to improve
the 'legal rights' formula."8
There are no Wisconsin cases which indicate what circumstances
give a taxpayer a "legal right" to challenge a rule of the Department of
Taxation in a declaratory judgment action and thus in any particular
case the taxpayer can only initiate the action and await the court's decision as to whether or not he has the requisite standing to challenge
the rule. There seems to be no valid reason why the courts should not
be liberal in allowing a taxpayer to challenge the validity of a rule as
it would seem all parties concerned would benefit from the early determination of such validity.
5 It is interesting to note that the possibility of using declaratory judgment actions to test the validity of tax regulaions on the federal level is currently
being considered. See American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Program and Committee Reports to be Presented at the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the Section, at 75 (1957).
611 Wis. Legis. Council Report, Part II, at 125 (1955).
7Id. at 126.
8Id. at 128
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If a taxpayer is allowed to initiate a declaratory judgment action to
test the validity of a rule which will effect a contemplated transaction
no difficulty arises as the Department of Taxation will clearly take no
action prior to the rendering of such judgment. Likewise, if the taxpayer is allowed to initiate a declaratory judgment action on a rule
applicable to a transaction entered into and the judgment is rendered
prior to the time for filing income tax returns covering such transaction
there is no problem. If a taxpayer initiates a declaratory judgment
action and the judgment is not rendered prior to the time for filing
returns on transactions which the challenged rule will effect the taxpayer may file his return and pay the tax as though the rule were
valid. This likewise presents no problem as the taxpayer may, upon
determination of the invalidity of the rule by the circuit court, apply to
the Department of Taxation for a refund. In applying for such a refund the taxpayer must show the reason for the claim (in this case the
invalidity of the rule under which the tax was paid) and the determination of this claim is subject to judicial reviewY Normally, the Department of Taxation should allow such refunds as a matter of course
without a second judicial test through the review procedure.
Once an additional assessment is made by the Department of Taxation, numerous difficulties arise. In Wisconsin, an initial assessment
is made on the basis of the income tax return, such return being presumed to be correct.' 0 An additional assessment is made by the Department of Taxation whenever a field of office audit indicates the initial
assessment was for a lesser amount of tax than that actually owed."
Once such an additional assessment becomes final the taxpayer may
not recover a refund or be allowed a credit: (1) on any item so assessed
if the assessment was based on an office audit; (2) on any year so
assessed if the assessment was based on a field audit.'2 The statutes
denying such refund or credit are clear and unambiguous and there
are no provisions for exceptions; thus it would seem there are no
circumstances under which such a refund or credit will be allowed. It
is thus apparent that any relief afforded a taxpayer by a declaratory
judgment rendered after an additional assessment has become final is
illusory only, as the taxpayer still must pay the tax and will be barred
from recovery by refund. This is true even though the rule under
which the tax was assessed is declared invalid in the declaratory judgment action.
An additional assessment becomes final unless the taxpayer files an
application for abatement with the department of taxation within thirty
days after notification of such assessment. If this application is denied
9 Wis. STATS. §71.10 (10) (f) (1955).
10 Id. at 71.11 (13).
11 Id. at 71.11(16), 71.11 (20), 71.11(21).
12 Id. at 71.10(10) (d).
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the assessment becomes final unless the taxpayer files a petition for
review with the Board of Tax Appeals within thirty days. 13 When the
Board of Tax Appeals renders a decision in such a review the decision
and the assessment becomes final unless the taxpayer appeals to the
Circuit Court within thirty days. 14 Finally, the judgment by the Circuit
Court is final unless the taxpayer takes an appeal to the Supreme Court
of the State of Wisconsin within thirty days.' 5
Thus, if a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of
a rule is to be of any value the taxpayer must prevent any additional
assessment based on such rule from becoming final.
THE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
In considering the Department of Taxation and declaratory judgment actions the first question that arises is whether or not a declaratory judgment action can be initiated after an additional assessment
is made by the Department. Sec. 71.12 (3) provides that no party shall
be allowed in any action to question an assessment unless an application
for abatement has been filed with the Department of Taxation, such
application has been denied, and a petition for review has been filed
with the Board of Tax Appeals. However, sec. 227.05 (1) provides:
"Declaratory judgments may be rendered whether or not the
plaintiff has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity
of the rule in question." [emphasis supplied]
Perusal of the report of the Legislative Committee on Administrative Rule Making indicates the legislature intended this section to
allow actions for declaratory judgment to be initiated after action was
commenced by the administrative agency. After an extensive discussion
of the doctrine that no resort may be had to the courts until all administrative remedies have exhausted, the committee stated:
....

The Wisconsin Administrative Procedures Act contains

provisions dealing expressly with the exhaustion doctrine. Sec.
227.05 (1) provides that a declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the
agency to pass on the validity of the rule in question."' 8r
and later:
"The exhaustion of remedies doctrine frequently has been
applied by the Wisconsin courts but apparently not arbitrarily.
The doctrine has been
abolished with respect to declaratory
'
judgment proceeding."'

This would seem to indicate that the declaratory judgment procedure
may be resorted to after assessment by the Department of Taxation.
Id. at 71.12(1).
14 Id. at 73.01(5) (e), 73.015 (2), 227.16(1).
'5 Id. at 227.21.
16 I1 Wis. Legis. Council Report, Part II, at 125 (1955).
17 Id. at 128.
13

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

In both cases the taxpayer must prevent the assessment from becoming final or the declaratory judgment will be of little avail. Clearly,
this may be done by filing an application for abatement with the Department of Taxation and, if this is denied, appealing to the Board of
Tax Appeals. 18 However, this necessitates maintaining two actions at
one time with the attendant expense. A more desirable method would
be to file the application in abatement and then obtain a stay of the
proceedings on this application until the declaratory judgment is rendered.
One possible method of accomplishing this would be to obtian an
order for a temporary stay of proceedings (injunction) from the Circuit Court for Dane County. Historically, Wisconsin courts have been
reluctant to enjoin administrative agencies.
In Wagner v. Leenhouts 9 the plaintiff asked an injunction restraining the assessor from assessing his income and auditing his books until
such time as it could be judicially determined if his income was eligible
for taxation. The court held that: "Equity will not enjoin an apprehended illegal assessment" on the basis that it is to be assumed that the
assessor will act legally in performing his duties. It is thus clear that
no injunctive relief could be obtained prior to an assessment.
Dictum in the Wagner case held that equity will not enjoin an illegal
assessment when there is an adequate legal remedy, no extraordinary
facts being shown. Moreover, the party against whom an assessment
has been made has an adequate remedy through statutory provisions
for the appeal of administrative decisions.
The above case, however, is not a situation in which the court in
which the injunction was requested has been specifically granted
primary jurisdiction over the question of law involved in the issue, as
is the case in declaratory judgment actions. Sec. 227.05 (1) gives
primary jurisdiction on the question of the validity of a rule of an administrative agency to the Circuit Court for Dane County whether or
not petitioner has exhausted the administrative remedies. 20 It would
seem that this court, having primary jurisdiction, would not be prevented from ordering a stay of administrative proceedings to insure
the effectiveness of its judgments. The rule in the Wagner case was
devised to facilitate expeditious handling of appeals of administrative
decisions by confining them to statutorily designated channels. Certainly the intent of the rule would be violated by compelling a parfy
to conduct parallel actions in a court of primary jurisdiction and an
administrative agency on the basis that adequate legal review may be
obtained on appeal from the decision of the administrative agency.
is See note 13 supra.
19 208 Wis. 292, 242 N.W. 144 (1932), appeal dismissed 287 U.S. 571 (1932).
20 See note 16 and note 17 supra.

COMMENTS

1958]

Thus there would seem to be no valid reason why the Circuit Court
for Dane County should not enjoin the proceedings of the Department
of Taxation until such court has determined the validity of the rule
in question.
THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

When a decision of the Department of Taxation is appealed to the
Board of Tax Appeals and the validity of a rule pertinent to a decision
is challenged, the question arises as to whether the B.T.A. may determine the validity of such rule. Sec. 73.01 (5) (a) sets forth the
powers of the B.T.A.:
"Subject to the provisions of judicial review contained in
the Statutes, the 'board shall be the final authority for the hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising
under the tax laws of the state, except such as may be otherwise
expressly designated."
This would seem to give broad powers to the B.T.A. However, Sec.
227.05 (1) provides declaratory judgment actions shall be "the exclusive means of judicial review of the validity of a rule" with four
specific exceptions which do not include the B.T.A. 2 1 Thus the determining of the validity of a rule could be a power not granted to
the B.T.A. as one "otherwise expressly designated" under 73.01 (5)
(a). The problem hinges on the question of the nature of review by
the B.T.A.: is such review judicial?
In Kaukauna v. Department of Taxation22 it was held that:
"Prior to the enactment of ch. 412, Laws of 1939, the Wisconsin tax commission exercised administrative powers and
exercised quasi-judicial functions by holding hearings for review as provided by law. In 1939 the legislature created two
separate and distinct departments. The administrative work
was placed in the Wisconsin Department of Taxation, and the
quasi-judicial

functions were transferred to the Wisconsin

Board of Tax Appeals. Thus the taxpayer was afforded a review of quasi-judicial questions before an independent tribunal."
It is thus clear that review by the B.T.A. is quasi-judicial review.
The report of the Legislative Committee on Administrative Rule
Making would seem to indicate legislative intent to embrace quasijudicial review within the "judicial review" provisions of the statutes. The recommendations of the committee were that the exclusiveness of declaratory judgment proceedings in determining the validity
of an administrative rule should be clarified; "either by specifying
the forms of proceedings in which review of rules may be had or by
providing that review may be had in any type of proceedings where
21WIs. STATS.
22250

§227.05(3) (1955).

Wis. 196, 26 N.W.2d 637 (1947).
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The legislature adopted the

former method in sec. 227.05 (3). The use of the term "proceedings"
by the committee seem to indicate that all proceedings which are not
granted specific authority to determine validity of a rule may not do
so. This language is clearly broad enough to include quasi-judicial
proceedings. Thus legislative intent would seem to indicate that "judicial review" as used in 227.05 (1) would include quasi-judicial review
and thus the B.T.A. would be excluded from determining the validity
of a rule of the Department of Taxation.
If this interpretation is correct the procedure to be followed is
clear. Sec. 227.05 (4) provides that if the validity of a rule is challenged in judicial proceeding other than one in which its validity may
be determined, the party so challenging shall move for a stay of proceedings and institute a declaratory judgment action. When this
judgment is rendered it shall be binding upon the court in which the
validity of the rule was challenged (in this case, the Board of Tax
Appeals).
Thus a taxpayer who had instituted a declaratory judgment action
prior to an additional assessment by the Department of Taxation
would not attempt to enjoin proceedings by the Department of Taxation but would file his application for abatement and if it were denied,
appeal to the B.T.A. As soon as the B.T.A. assumed jurisdiction he
would move for a stay of proceedings, and initiate the declaratory
judgment action.
One factor would indicate that the legislature intended the B.T.A.
to be able to determine, for purposes of B.T.A. proceedings, the
validity of a contested rule. If a taxpayer is an individual his appeal
from a decision of the B.T.A. will go to the circuit court for the county
in which he resided where judicial review of the decision will be afforded. 24 Sec. 227.05 (3) (e) provides that this court may determine
the validity of a rule when such is challenged in an appeal from a decision of an administrative agency, this being one of the specific exceptions to the exclusive determination of rule validity by declaratory
judgment action. If the taxpayer is a corporation his appeal from the
B.T.A. goes to the Circuit Court for Dane County 25 which clearly can
determine the validity of rules. 2 6 It would thus seem that the legisla-

ture would not intend the proceedings of
and a declaratory judgment initiated to
rule when the validity of the rule may
from the B.T.A. The incongruous result
23 IIWis. Legis. Council Report, Part

24 See note 14 supra.
25 Ibid.
2GSee notes 1 and 14 supra.

the B.T.A. to be interrupted
determine the validity of a
be determined upon appeal
of such interpretation in the

II, at 127 (1955).
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case of a corporate taxpayer would be the suspending of the proceedings of the B.T.A. while the Circuit Court for Dane County determined the validity of a rule. Upon such determination the B.T.A.
would render a decision and such decision could be appealed back to
the Circuit Court for Dane County for review. It might be argued
that, in the case of an individual taxpayer, the legislature intended
such a course of action in that, through handling numerous declaratory
judgment actions, the Circuit Court for Dane County would become
an "expert" court on the matter of administrative rules. The report
of the Legislative Committee on Administrative Rule Making indicated no legislative intent to create such an "expert" court, however.
If the B.T.A. can make a limited determination of the validity of
a rule the taxpayer can still initiate a declaratory judgment action
after the B.T.A. assumed jurisdiction or continue one previously initiated. Sec. 73.015 (1) provides:
". .. no person shall contest, in any action or proceeding,
any matter reviewable by the board unless such person shall
first have availed himself of a hearing before the board. .. ."
However, sec. 227.05 (1) abolishes the doctrine that administrative
remedies must be exhausted before applying to the courts in respect
to declaratory judgment actions. If the quasi-judicial determination
by the B.T.A. is not judicial and thus the B.T.A. can determine the
validity of a rule, such determination would seem to be administrative
in its nature. Thus the abolition of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine would negate the effect of 73.015 (1) on declaratory
judgment actions.
As a practical matter the taxpayer would probably not initiate a
declaratory judgment action after an appeal to the B.T.A. as it would
be more economical and convenient to wait for a determination of
the validity of a rule until appeal from the B.T.A. to the circuit
court.
If an appeal is taken to the B.T.A. and a declaratory judgment
action is pending in the Circuit Court for Dane County the taxpayer
must still prevent the assessment from becoming final to obtain actual relief. Assessments become final when a decision is handed down
by the B.T.A. and not appealed to the circuit court within thirty
27
days.
As in the case of actions by the Department of Taxation, actions
by the B.T.A. might be suspended by temporary injunctions issued
by the Circuit Court for Dane County. The reasoning applicable
to enjoining the Department of Taxation would apply to the B.T.A.
by analogy although no actual cases of injunction of the B.T.A. have
27

WIs.

STATS.

§73.01(5) (e) (1955).
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been decided in Wisconsin. In fact, it would seem there might be an
even more valid reason for the granting of injunctive relief in the
case of the B.T.A. Art. VII, Sec. 8 of the Constitution of the State
of Wisconsin provides:
"The circuit court shall have power to issue injunctions and
other writs necessary to carry into effect their judgments,
orders, and decrees and give them general control over inferior
jurisdictions."
In Ballard v. Goodland2- it was held that: "... all tribunals.., acting in

a quasi-judicial capacity are subject to the jurisdiction of the circuit
court." This clearly indicates that the B.T.A. falls under the control
of the circuit court as an inferior jurisdiction. There would seem
to be no reason why a superior court having primary jurisdiction in
a matter could not temporarily enjoin the proceedings of an inferior
quasi-judicial body under its control in order to prevent duplicity of
actions.
If the taxpayer cannot obtain an injunction aganist the B.T.A.
and the board holds the contested rule valid the taxpayer would have
to appeal to the circuit court to obtain relief. The incongrous result
would be that the taxpayer, if an individual, would be challenging the
validity of the same rule in an appeal before the circuit court in
the county in which he resides and in a declaratory judgment action
in the Circuit Court for Dane County. It is clear that one circuit
court could not enjoin the other as, under the doctrine of Stahl v.
Broeskert,29 injunctive relief is not available when courts of equal
dignity claim jurisdiction as to the same issue. Thus it would seem
the taxpayer must carry on two actions simultaneously and plead the
first decision handed down as res judicata to the other action. In the
case of a corporate taxpayer the appeal and declaratory judgment action would merge in the Circuit Court for Dane County. It is hardly
probable that the legislature intended this result.
CONCLUSION

This is an area in which existing statutes and decisions leave
many important questions unanswered. The taxpayer has no way of
knowing when he has the requisite degree of standing to challenge a
rule through a declaratory judgment action. The legislature has declined to set forth what factual situations give a taxpayer such standnig and thus the question will only be determined by future judicial
decisions. Clearly, much of the value of the declaratory judgment action as a method of tax relief will hinge on such decisions. At best,
the determining of a workable standard by this method will take time.
Many of the other ambiguities can be settled by legislative clarifi28
29

159 Wis. 393, 150 N.W. 488 (1915).

167 Wis. 113, 166 N.W. 653 (1918).
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cation. First, there should be clarification as to the procedure to follow when the Department of Taxation assesses a taxpayer under a
rule the validity of which the taxpayer is challenging in a pending
declaratory judgment action. Secondly, there should be clarification
of the procedure to be followed when an additional assessment is
made and the taxpayer desires to challenge the validity of the rule
under which it was made. Thirdly, the legislature should indicate the
scope of the power of the Board of, Tax Appeals to determine the
validity of a rule. It would be especially helpful to know if the procedure of the B.T.A. must be suspended and a declaratory judgment
sought whenever the validity of a rule is challenged in a B.T.A. proceeding.
Until there is such clarification the value of the declaratory judgment action as a means of determining the validity of a rule of the Department of Taxation is seriously hampered by uncertainty and ambiguity.
GEORGE

J.

MALY, JR.

